Empire: Total War Heaven

Alright, here is another one. What might have happened had Julius Ceaser not crossed the Rubicon? What if he laid down his arms and accepted his punishment of banishment. Would the republic have survived longer? would someones else do another 'Ceaser'?

I do think someone else would have taken over, the method might have been different. The actions of Sulla and Marius had already been done, and I think someone else would have eventually gone the extra mile.

The Republic survived Caesar, but it didn't survive his death and Octavian's rise.

It's sometimes disputed how dysfunctional the Republic had become, but it should be noted that there had been a succession of civil wars and communal violence in the 1st century BC.

Whether someone else could have emulated Caesar, at least in the degree of his success, is doubtful. They would have had to have gathered a sizeable army, have had a command long enough to gain glory and popularity with the people, and been close enough to Italy to have a chance of seizing Rome.

It's unlikely that anyone would have been permitted to achieve such a position again.

Pompey was the only other person in Caesar's time who could have achieved this (note that he was governor of the Spains, and so commander of the legions stationed there). But he didn't need to, because the anti-Caesarian Senators were sucking up to him to get him to counter-balance Caesar.

What is probable is that if anyone else had done it, it would have been far bloodier than Caesar's. When governing Italy in Caesar's absence, for example, Antony unleashed legionaries on the mob in Rome, the first man to do so since Sulla. Sulla, and Antony and Octavian, also proscribed their enemies. It seems likely that Pompey would have done the wame to Caesarians had he won.

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What if Ceasar wasnt assassinated? How would his planned expedition against the Parthians have gone? Would he have had another Crassus like disaster on his hands? Would he have taken Octavian with him? Could the conspirators revolted whilst he was in the east?

I think Caesar would've held his own against the Parthians and done a far better job than Crassus. He was a far more audacious and flexible commander than Crassus ever was, and he wouldn't have dismissed the capabilities of the Parthians out of an inflated sense of pride especially since Crassus' own defeat would serve as a reminder of such folly. I could see him going as far as to conquer Mesopotamia, but any further would've dangerously exposed his supply lines. He would've had to spend a considerable amount of time in Seleucia-on-the-Tigris (one of the three most prominent cities in the East) convincing the populace to side with Rome and to quell any pockets of resistance or other trouble spots before going any further eastwards.

I doubt he would've taken Octavian with him, but it's likely he would've left Mark Antony in Rome to uphold the peace and keep the Senate in line. The conspirators might then go as far as to shift their sights on Antony, which would cause a power struggle similar to the Liberator's Civil War with the historic positions of Brutus and Cassius reversed and Caesar forced to holed up in the East.

Didn't Caesar plan an invasion of Dacia as well?

It appears so Punic. Apparently, the plan was to March into Dacia before the invasion of Pathia to eliminate their powerful King and hopefully break up his kingdom. This was apparently due to the King's siding with Pompey in the Civil war.

[This message has been edited by Awesome Eagle (edited 03-10-2013 @ 05:13 AM).]

It seems likely that Caesar intended to take Octavius with him on the Parthian expedition. Suetonius refers to Caesar's plans of invading Dacia and Parthia, and then says Caesar sent Octavius ahead of him (Caesar, that is) to Appolonia in Illyria.

Hearing of the murder of his uncle, Octavian returned to Italy.

It would have been an ideal time to give Octavian some tutoring in War and politics. A many day journey, alot of Ceaser's knowledge could have been passed to Octavian. Also, The military experience would have done Octavian very good, as we can later see his reliance on Agrippa to win his battles for him. But if this went ahead, whose to say Octavian would have needed Agrippa to win any battles. Ceaser's continued living would have changed a great many thing in Rome and roman politics. But in his later months, Ceaser's pride seemed to be getting the better of him and he insulted the senate once too often.

One major mistake Caesar made was declaring himself dictator perpetuus. The memory of Sulla's dictatorship was still alive. Of course, he had no option since he had too many enemies in the Senate to be handed all the offices, as happened with Octavian.

The Senate declared Caesar dictator for life, not Caesar himself. He was already dictator for ten years. With the example of Sulla before him, it probably made sense to stay on long enough to entrench his laws. Practically all of Sulla's changes were overthrown in a few years.

Caesar seems to have become a bit annoyed by senatorial sycophants loading him with unasked-for honours.

Shakespeare, Julius Caesar II.1:



Shakespeare's cynical twist was an echoing of the ancient historians.

Augustus himself didn't hold all the offices, but he was granted tribunician power (without actually being a tribune of the plebs) and the power of enacting laws. He often held the consulship though.

[This message has been edited by Pitt (edited 03-11-2013 @ 10:55 AM).]

It would be naive to think that Caesar's extended and perpetual dictatorships, though officially from the Senate, were not entirely concordant with Caesar's wishes.

I don't think Sulla's dictatorship was the particular specter that prompted the assassination - remember, many of the Republican side in the civil war were Sulla's men, and Sulla's reforms were supposed to be conservative in nature.

For more on how Sulla's laws lasted/were revoked, check out Flower's Roman Republics (2010) about how the "Republic" was actually a series of republics with collapses and re-establishments. Very cool short read that will change thought processes on 2nd-1st c. BCE.

Caesar does seem to have been more interested in the realities of power than the panoply, hence his apparent disregard for the honours heaped on him by fawning (or fearing? Or felonious?) senators.

I would tend to agree that his being appointed dictator perpetuus is what may have tipped at least some of the conspirators over the edge, and in that sense it was a mistake. We have no way of knowing whether Caesar seriously intended to remain dictator until death or whether he would lay down the reins after a number of years. He seems to have been a good administrator, and few objected at the time or after his death to his measures to improve administration of the empire.

His dismissal of his lictors suggests he was either fatalistic or genuinely believed nobody would actually try to kill him.

Here's a 'what if' for ya.

What if Napoleon had stayed and campaigned in Spain? I'm of the belief Napoleon would have done better in Russia if he had experience with the Spanish Ulcer. He would have had to think of a way to deal with a hostile populace, limited local supplies, and possibly checked Wellington in battle, what with having his natural strategic skills and overwhelming numbers. He could have pinned Wellington somewhere while his not-as-bright-but-still-capable Marshals dealt with issues elsewhere.

Wellington (or Sir Arthur Wellesley, as he still was at this time), had already been recalled to Britain, along with his two superior officers.

Wellesley had defeated the French in open battle twice, most recently at Vimeiro, when his seniors stepped in and arranged a truce, under which the French would be permitted to depart Portugal.

A furious British Parliament demanded answers, and Wellesley's career could well have been ruined.

In the meantime, Sir John Moore took over the army, and he was in command when Napoleon arrived in Spain. Ultimately, Moore was forced to withdraw, fighting a battle at Coruna to cover the withdrawal of his army by the Royal Navy.



With Moore's death (he was struck by a cannonball during the battle), there was a great deal of debate as to whether there was any point in sending an army back to the peninsula. Wellesley argued forcefully that it was worthwhile, and the government ultimately agreed with him. By that stage, Napoleon had well and truly left Spain.

Napoleon's personal intervention in Spain was at the head of a quarter of a million Frenchmen, at a time when the disunited Spanish were trying to field regular armies to face the French in open battle. With active resistance crushed and the British forced to withdraw, there was little point in Napoleon himself remaining in Spain. Especially since the Austrians were bestirring themselves (the battles of Aspern-Essling and Wagram occurred not long after).

I have another one. What if the battle of Actium in 31BC was won by Antonius and not Augustus? Would Antony prove politically able to face the Senate without a bloodbath? I highly doubt it, as he acted brutally against Cicero, mutiliating and the exposing parts of his body in the Rostra. I suspect that the civil wars would have been prolonged for another decade or so, unless Antony managed to face Octavian's supporters immediately.

Nice one Alex, sorry i didnt notice it before. Honestly, i dont see a victory for Antony as a good thing at all for the Romans. Antony by this time (this is from memory so may not be accurate) irrational and 'gone tropo'. I am sorry i cant give a very good answer, but hopefully this bump will provide you with someone who will...

BUMP

I don't think the consequences of defeat were as great for Octavian as they were for Antony, because he had the backing of the senate to remove Antony from the equation and go to war with Egypt. Antony had to win or he would be decisively on the back foot and in danger of losing everything. If Octavian was defeated, perhaps he could have lost some of his power as a result, but politically his position was somewhat more solid so I'd imagine it would just be a question of building another fleet and going at it again until they won. But if by some stroke of fortune Antony prevailed and became the only uncontested ruler of Rome, I doubt it would have been long before someone bumped him off. Octavian had the political skill to hold it all together, Antony had many qualities but he was no politician.

Ok, i have got another one;

What if Scipio Africanus was not allowed to undertake an Invasion of Africa? How would this change the Punic wars and their outcomes?

Quoted from AE:

What if Scipio Africanus was not allowed to undertake an Invasion of Africa? How would this change the Punic wars and their outcomes?

The Senate actually did oppose his proposal to invade Africa, but he ended up doing it regardless of whether he had permission or not. The biggest difference being that he would've received military and financial support for the campaign, instead of only relying on the troops he'd personally gathered and trained in Sicily.

However, if he'd never invaded Africa at all I can imagine the Second Punic War lasting much longer than it did as the loss of Spain and threat of invasion might've been enough to convince the fickle senate of Carthage to send proper supplies and reinforcements to Hannibal in Italy. With a revitalized army, Hannibal would've been able to take the fight to the Romans instead of relying on the raids, ambushes and hit-and-run tactics that he'd been using in the years following the Battle of Cannae. Faced with a restored Hannibal, the Roman Senate would've most likely recalled Scipio and his forces back to Italy where he would've fought his first, and perhaps only, duel against his legendary teacher.

If Hannibal had been victorious in this "alternative duel", then I'd like to believe that he would not repeat the mistake he made after Cannae and instead lay siege to Rome itself.

That's my take on the question, but I believe our resident expert in Punic culture will reveal a far superior answer than my own.

I'll piggy back off of your scenario, of a replenished Hannibal in Italy.


So let's say Hannibal gets reinforcements that give his army a number of 50,000, which isn't as unreasonable as it seems. I distinctly remember compiling a number of between 35-50K troops Carthage sent to various places, Sardinia, Spain, amongst others, instead of to Hannibal. Hannibal, having campaigned on the ground he would have undoubtedly would have faced Scipio on, would have the local advantage. Scipio on the other hand might have been handicapped if he lost his Iberian army, which would be reasonable to assume so as to keep a Roman presence in Iberia to check any Carthaginian resurgence in the area.

Scipio's biggest advantage when he faced the Carthaginians in Africa is that he planned on his terms, and drilled his men to a new standard that the other Romans didn't meet. That is why he was able to pull of the brilliant victory at Illipa in the fashion he did. Take away his men, he probably would not have fared very well against Hannibal, indeed I am of the opinion he would have lost, Hannibal having the local knowledge of the terrain, cavalry advantage (Scipio wouldn't have Masinissa's Numidians), as well as troops on par with Romans in the area of arms and armor, depending on how long after Hannibal received his reinforcements and how soon Scipio attacked. The real debate in this case would be how Scipio would deal with a defeat. He wouldn't be a clumsy or rash commander as the other Romans Hannibal had faced, so the defeat wouldn't be devastating, but if Scipio decided to give battle to Hannibal, he would have a good idea in his mind that the odds were equal, or in his favor, and thus it would be major. The fact he broke his string of victories might have shaken any support he had at the Senate, and possibly even his own troops. The greatest of Roman commanders himself loses to Hannibal? How can we face this guy?? Scipio would be hard pressed to get another army to face him with, and would most likely revert to the Fabian strategy of denying him more victories and area. Thus the great Scipio would go down in history as the Roman who took Iberia, and that's it.

I don't believe this would change the outcome of the war. I do believe Rome would emerge victorious, though at a much greater cost. They dedicated too much to the war to have it merely be a status quo result. I do think Carthage would have been better off though. The Numidians wouldn't get the Roman support they needed to infringe upon Carthaginian territory, and Carthage would've been forced to increase its hold on Africa even more after the war, meaning I believe Hanno would get his way in taking more of Africa. The Barcids and Hannoids might have allied themselves politically, and I can't see any reason why this would be bad for Carthage aside from perhaps making Rome nervous as Carthage would extremely prosperous (Hanno was in favor of agriculture and mercantilism based off of it), knowledgeably in warfare (Hannibal would no doubt have influenced any army that remained, arming its soldiers in the Roman fashion if it armed its men) and not crippled from a pesky Roman backed Numidian threat.


All of that could probably be formatted and stated better, but meh, I'll leave it as is.

Well, even if reinforcements were sent to Hannibal, I don't believe he could have won the war. Hannibal's army was comprised primarily from mercenaries, the upkeep cost of which would be tremendously high, even for the rich Carthaginians. On the other hand, the Roman army consisted of levied citizens and allies who were much cheaper to maintain.

Another factor that should be taken into account is the sheer size of the Roman military. I mean, even after the loss of about 111,000 men in the battles of Trebia, Trasimene and Cannae, the Romans fielded between 214 and 210 BC 48,000 men in Scipio's Hisapanic campaign, 20,000 men in tbe siege of Syracuse, while successfully keeping Hannibal at bay at Nola and Beneventum and fighting the First Macedonian war. It is highly possible that the Romans would rather lose Hispania than have a reinforced Hannibal wandering in the Italian pensinular.

In addition, even if Hannibal was supplied by the Southern Italian cities, his lines of communication were considerably longer. My opinion is that while Hannibal would win in the battlefield, he would be strategically defeated...

Quoted from Alex:

Well, even if reinforcements were sent to Hannibal, I don't believe he could have won the war.

I'm inclined to agree. In my opinion, Hannibal missed his chance to win the war when he failed to follow up on his victory at Cannae by marching on Rome. While he may not have been able to take the city itself, the news that Rome herself was besieged might've been enough to convince many of Rome's allies to switch sides and send troops to reinforce Hannibal's army. Surrounded by Hannibal's men and abandoned by their closest allies, Rome could've very well surrendered and allowed history to play out very differently.

Quoted from Alex:

Hannibal's army was comprised primarily from mercenaries, the upkeep cost of which would be tremendously high, even for the rich Carthaginians.

While this was certainly true during the First Punic War, it is my understanding that Hannibal's men were personally bound to him and thus unquestioningly loyal to him. This is evidenced by the fact that he never faced a revolt or mutiny during his entire campaign in Italy. Not even Alexander or Caesar managed to end their careers with such a spotless record of devotion.

Also, I believe Hamilcar Barca had instituted military reforms that put an end to Carthage's reliance on mercenaries and instead created an army that was bound to Carthage through diplomacy, political dealings and marriages to their subject peoples, and oaths of personal loyalty. However, I may be misinformed and once again leave it to Punic to correct my misunderstandings and any mistakes on my part.

Quoted from Alex:

Another factor that should be taken into account is the sheer size of the Roman military. I mean, even after the loss of about 111,000 men in the battles of Trebia, Trasimene and Cannae, the Romans fielded between 214 and 210 BC 48,000 men in Scipio's Hisapanic campaign, 20,000 men in tbe siege of Syracuse, while successfully keeping Hannibal at bay at Nola and Beneventum and fighting the First Macedonian war.

If we're using an aborted Roman invasion of Africa as the point of divergence, then it means that the Carthaginian defeats at Utica, Great Plains, Cirta, the Po Valley and Zama are nullified as well. I'm not familiar enough to no the exact total of all the Carthaginian soldiers who participated in these battles, but I estimate this would leave Carthage with somewhere between 60-80,000 soldiers, cavalry and elephants to reinforce Hannibal in Italy. This would put him on equal, if not superior, footing with whatever forces Scipio could command with the key factor being that Scipio would not have any Numidian cavalry since Syphax would still be King of Numidia and Masinissa would never have come to power (as Punic pointed out earlier).

I'd like to elaborate more, but I have to meet up with someone so hopefully Punic will intervene once again and offer a counter-argument of his own.

[This message has been edited by DominicusUltimus (edited 04-13-2013 @ 05:03 PM).]

Gladly

Quoted from DU:

While he may not have been able to take the city itself, the news that Rome herself was besieged might've been enough to convince many of Rome's allies to switch sides and send troops to reinforce Hannibal's army. Surrounded by Hannibal's men and abandoned by their closest allies, Rome could've very well surrendered and allowed history to play out very differently.

See, I don't think Rome or her allies would have buckled, nor would Hannibal have gained anything in the attempt. Rome still had I believe 2 legions out and about in Italy, the minute they heard of Rome's plight, they would have come running. Being pinned between a city and a legion isn't where anyone wants to fight, especially one who has had his army reduced to somewhere around 22,000 and was battered and bruised. So while Hannibal would undoubtedly gained massive fear points, he couldn't gain anything tactically or strategically from it. Rome didn't show any signs of ultimate surrender to anyone in this time period, and I don't think Hannibal would have started a trend.

As for Hamilcar's military reforms, they weren't really reforms. Carthage's military was reliant on mercenaries, but the term can be, and should be, taken loosely. Those troops who were given to Carthage by allies can be called mercenaries, as they weren't of Punic origin and were being paid to fight. A large number of Iberians were in the Punic armies in the first war, and when Hamilcar dropped by to conquer the place, part of the treaties he made with the local tribes was an annual allotment of troops for his army. Still technically mercenaries, but the way they were acquired changed.

Now the Iberians had the connection to Hamilcar/Barcids instead of Carthage and the money it had. It is always easier to be loyal to a person you can physically see, trust and uphold rather than a political entity that is distant. This is the bond that made the troops loyal. When Hasdrubal died, as the story goes, the troops saw in Hannibal a Hamilcar reborn. Hannibal's style of leadership also strengthened that bond, leading towards the front instead of from the rear, and was able to do this because he campaigned so much in Iberia, and was able to trust his other commanders to accomplish his grand plan in the battle. As a side note to the lack of mutinies and revolts Hannibal had, it should be noted that when he reached the Pyrenees he sent home a large number of his original army, which would most likely consist of any troublesome elements in his army, those with questionable loyalty and such. Add in the fact that when they get into Italy, there really is no turning back. The Romans will kill you in battle, and you can't desert because there is no way in Baals Fire you can get to Iberia or friendly territory again.

As for the paying of the mercenaries, Hannibal did it just fine for years in Italy with barely any support from Carthage. I think he could manage if he got reinforcements, as he would be able to enlarge the area he was contained in, if the Romans would be able to contain him at all.

Quoted from Punic:

See, I don't think Rome or her allies would have buckled, nor would Hannibal have gained anything in the attempt. Rome still had I believe 2 legions out and about in Italy, the minute they heard of Rome's plight, they would have come running. Being pinned between a city and a legion isn't where anyone wants to fight, especially one who has had his army reduced to somewhere around 22,000 and was battered and bruised. So while Hannibal would undoubtedly gained massive fear points, he couldn't gain anything tactically or strategically from it. Rome didn't show any signs of ultimate surrender to anyone in this time period, and I don't think Hannibal would have started a trend.

I used to think that as well, but I recently read 'Masters of Command: Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar and the Genius of Leadership' by Barry Strauss and became convinced by his argument that the mere act of laying siege to Rome might've been enough of a psychological blow to either convince a disheartened Roman (such as Lucius Caecilius Metellus) to throw open the gates, scare Rome's allies in Central Italy to follow the lead of their cousins in the south and join Hannibal or impress the Carthaginian Senate enough to send him real supplies and reinforcements.

While Rome may have had other forces outside of the city (such as the survivors of Cannae) these men would've either been too demoralized from their defeat or too terrified by news of the massacre at Cannae to successfully oppose Hannibal. Not every Roman general had the tenacity or resolve of the Scipios and I doubt there were many legionnaires who were willing to face a Carthaginian army that had annihilated a double-consular army that outnumbered them by as much as three-to-one.

However, I will not press the matter further and simply end it with the conclusion that we shall agree to disagree

Quoted from Punic:

Being pinned between a city and a legion isn't where anyone wants to fight, especially one who has had his army reduced to somewhere around 22,000 and was battered and bruised.

Strange, I was under the impression that Hannibal had at least 30,000 combat-capable men after Cannae although they would certainly be exhausted after so much fighting.