Empire: Total War Heaven

Could the book you've been reading by any chance be In the Name of Rome by Goldsworthy?

I like him too. A pity that he ended up on the losing side, or we would have been reading much more about him. Respecting the locals and honoring them always help. And he sure schooled Pompey good and laid a proper foundation for the latter's military education, even if it's paid with the price of blood, sweat and lives of his men.

Could the book you've been reading by any chance be In the Name of Rome by Goldsworthy?

Maybe.

[This message has been edited by Legion Of Hell (edited 12-19-2010 @ 01:50 PM).]

I first read about Sertorius in T A Dodge's volume on Julius Caesar. There, he was given part of a chapter but never more than that since the military history he was writing focused almost exclusively on Caesar, and Sertorius's assassination prevented his ever getting a chance to match wits with Pompey on a rematch later on. Perhaps then, Caesar could've found himself an ally or a potentially more dangerous rival?

Funny, I come back and find three threads on here that I had either posted before or had very lengthy discussions on. (Sicilian expedition, value of mercenaries (I can't find that thread but I know I asked the question, ironically, Machiavelli was my inspiration as well! And my man, Quintus Sertorius).

Not quite sure where the thread is supposed to go, but as far as Petraus learning from the good Sertorius, I'd say you have a role reversal. Sertorius' example should be followed by militants and insurgents - no more blowing market places to bits.

An interesting thing that I had never really questioned much was the psychological drama of Sertorius. Considering the fact that by the end of his life he had supposedly begun to change (those things he had done well, such as placating the locals, ceased to be done) and if I remember correctly Plutarch mentions him becoming more or less of an alcoholic (I might be off on this, haven't read the Plutarch account in at least two years). It must have been some sort of journey, mentally, to have gone from exile on the beaches of N. Africa to being the leader of what remained of the Marian cause, only to see it slip away from his grasp despite his success. Basically its a question of what goes through your mind when you know there is no possibility of longterm success?

As far as a rematch between Sertorius and Pompey goes, Pompous (my spelling) Magnus was a great organizer, but I would argue a less talented general.

Well, it's good to see you on the forums, MisplacedPope.

Would any other general have fared better in the same situation - Julius Caesar, Scipio Africanus, Hannibal, and maybe even Alexander?

We'll never know. But my guess is that they'd all have done roughly the same.

(Still, maybe Hannibal or Alexander might have had longer runs, seeing that both managed to do so well in places far away with few reinforcements and logistical support from home.)

Alexander's tendency to kill off both his own men and his officers would likely have resulted in him not lasting nearly as long. Alexander also was a vainglorious fellow who more often than not maneuvered himself into less than good strategic positions. He lacks the tact of Sertorius.

Hannibal, Hannibal is another question, but Hannibal was also facing a very different Roman army than Sertorius was. Both of them, however, made effective use of ambuscade and both demonstrated amazing subtlety in their strategic and tactical maneuvering.

Julius Caesar, eh, I don't know what to say. Perhaps roughly similar, since Caesar demonstrated his skill not only as a general but as a diplomat in dealing with allies, much like Sertorius did. However, one of Caesar's principal assets was his extreme boldness (indeed in his case, the gods favor the bold) whilst Sertorius was more cautious, in the situation Sertorius was in, I am not sure Caesar's flair would have been beneficial to the extent that it was for him in the situations he himself found himself in.

Scipio, well, Scipio was a very successful commander with an army that was certainly less than the quality of Caesar's (not that it was a poor army he or other commanders of the period were in command of, but the army of Caesar's day was far more uniform, displayed a greater capacity for engineering feats, and was in general more technically capable). Scipio was also quite benevolent/extravagant (as seen in the criticism he received whilst in Sicily preparing for the African invasion) which could either be of great use to him or completely backfire (mostly the personal extravagance of himself his retinue, benevolence is always a positive).

Its all speculation, and I was well known in my time to be highly critical of Alexander the Foolish (what was Furius' old name for him?) so perhaps people will take me to task on my analysis of his chances. C'est la vie.

Just a couple of observations and then a big digression. Firstly, victors write the history so I'm not surprised that Sertorius gets written of as bitter and drunk after the demise of his faction whereas Caesar generally gets almost as favorable an interpretation as possible of all his deeds and traits thanks to his position in the history controlled by and for Augustus thereafter.
Secondly, the ability to win with an inferior force is the best measure of a good tactician. Sun Tzu has a lot of sensible things to say about when to fight at all which is the province of great strategist. Sertorius was a good tactician and perhaps a good adminstrator. Did he have the strategic skills to take his faction to victory...moot point.

Here is the digression, did any of these interesting fellows change the course of history? Did Rome have to move from a republic to a monarchical model? It would seem clear that a succession of ambitious individuals were lining about to take power so that if not Sulla then another, if not Caesar then another, if not Augustus then another. This gives rise to the widely accepted theory that Rome could NOT govern its empire as a republic. I would suggest that it DID NOT but that the fascinating arrangement the republic put in place before Sulla's tyranny, Caesar's crossing of the rubicon and Augustus' assumption of enduring autocracy showed they COULD run a republican empire. Were pressures mounting, clearly. Did something have to give, probably. Did that something have to take the form of autocratic authority...quite arguable.

What do you think?

Welcome, Trajan Tragic, to our hallowed halls.

A republican empire? If it were small, as in the early days, it could well work. One of the many problems assailing the later empire was the distance from Rome to the provinces and the one-year term of office for governors. This was partially solved by proroguing governors, or giving them longer terms, but that meant the next collection of magistrates leaving office would have far fewer opportunities to recoup what they spent getting elected.

Another problem plaguing a republican empire was the Senate. The Senators were the ones elected to the offices, and they were more interested in themselves and their power than they were their jobs. Plus there was a polarization of the Senate, which formed basis for blocs of senators to work together to hamper the other bloc. Not so much push through their own laws as to block the other guy's.

So as much as I would have liked to have seen a republican empire exist, it was basically doomed due to the crab-in-a-bucket mentality of the small-minded men wielding whatever political power they could get their hands on.

That led them to turn against Caesar, who in turn turned against them. And crushed them.

I've just seen this article and I'd like to say that Sertorius was indeed a brilliant general. The only men I could say would be able to do the same/better are: Lucius Licinius Lucullus and Julius Caesar later in the Civil War (and Aurelian perhaps). They all had to cope with under-resourced armies against enemies who greatly overpowered them. Also, there's nothing wrong with Goldsworthy. I've read an unbelievable amount of his books. His sources are good as well. He introduced me to Polybius and Livy.

I've just seen this article and I'd like to say that Sertorius was indeed a brilliant general. The only men I could say would be able to do the same/better are: Lucius Licinius Lucullus and Julius Caesar later in the Civil War (and Aurelian perhaps). They all had to cope with under-resourced armies against enemies who greatly overpowered them. Also, there's nothing wrong with Goldsworthy. I've read an unbelievable amount of his books. His sources are good as well. He introduced me to Polybius and Livy.

Lucullus' problem was that he seems to have had no social skills whatsoever. Sertorius kept his men loyal and won the support of the locals (and made it look easy to such a degree that his murderer thought anybody could do the same), Lucullus pissed off the locals and his own men at the same time. Military genius can only take you so far on its own when you hold yourself apart - even Alexander found that out the hard way.

Which made Sertorius all the more successful as a leader.

Sertorius certainly was a great general, but in the long term he could not win a war against Rome. At the time of his death the balance was already starting to favor pompey and the other republican generals. Had he not been murdered the war would have continued for much longer, but the outcome would likely have been the same. IIRC Goldsworthy says that sertorius knew he could not win and that rome would not stop untill he was defeated. He became sad and possibly as a result started to drink heavy. It still happens these days when people are in a bad situation (divorced, no job and such)

As to which general was best. That's impossible to say. Each of them was in a different place, fighting different enemies under different circumstances. Caesar more than once got himself at a point where he could easily have suffered defeat, even death (river sambre, britannia, Dyrachium).
Overall you could say that Sertorius was a talented guerilla leader, pompey a great organiser and a good general, caesar a men who could gain the love of his men and who could stun his enemies by his speedy actions, alexander a men who could inspire his men, but was very reckless and hannibal was a master in ambuscade and deception. And you can add a lot more generals to the list (like scipio africanus and aemilianus)

About rome and the republic. The republic had become ineffective. Corruption and violence around votings were one example. Senators would rather see a problem continue to exist than granting another senator the honor of solving it. Cato sometimes kept talking the whole day to prevent the senate from voting. It's hard to see how a continuation of the republic would be good for rome. Overall the principate worked at least reasonably well untill Nero, and even after that it continued to work untill (according to some) the days of Marcus Aurelius. But in the end of the western roman empire, the imperial system had also become very corrupt and ineffective. Actually it's quite a miracle that rome endured for so long despite those countless civil wars and barbarian raids.

[This message has been edited by Thompsoncs (edited 06-23-2011 @ 04:11 PM).]

About rome and the republic. The republic had become ineffective. Corruption and violence around votings were one example. Senators would rather see a problem continue to exist than granting another senator the honor of solving it. Cato sometimes kept talking the whole day to prevent the senate from voting. It's hard to see how a continuation of the republic would be good for rome.

There's a common conception that the Republic was functional until Caesar came along and overthrew it - it wasn't. The entire first century BC was spent in civil war of some variety or another, and before that corruption was rampant, allowing the likes of Jugurtha to embarrass the state.

First the Social War, then Marius and Sulla, then Pompey and Sertorius followed by the Catiline Conspiracy followed by Julius Caesar and Pompey, then Octavian and Antony, then the Second Triumverate vs Cassius and Brutus, then Sextus Pompeius and finally Octavian and Antony once again. Granted, some of these were continuations of past conflicts, but the point is that there was no peace in the first century BC. This was not in any shape or form a functional government - society and Roman military superiority continued in spite of it, not because of it.

Overall the principate worked at least reasonably well untill Nero, and even after that it continued to work untill (according to some) the days of Marcus Aurelius.

The Principate is pretty widely recognized to have survived until the onset of the Third Century Crisis, when Alexander Severus died in AD 235. The Severan dynasty certainly walked a fine line between order and chaos, but the Empire was functional and recognizable as essentially the same Principate left by Augustus. It wasn't until 285 when Diocletian established the Dominate that the Empire really took a new form, after the fifty years of change that characterized the third century. It's certainly romantic to see Marcus Aurelius as "the last good Emperor" who tried his best but couldn't stem the collapse, but realistically there was another entire dynasty containing some very successful rulers after him before things really went to hell.

True, but these guys weren't really all that successful. Even before the third-century crisis, the Romans were in trouble. The number one cause of the collapse of the Principate, in my opinion, was the lack of a strong line of succession. Anybody popular with there soldiers and who had a fair amount of talent for military affairs could become a Emperor. As such, the latter days of the Empire where characterized by even more civil wars than the republic that proceeded it.

Even in the earlier half of the Principate, there was a fair amount of civil war. The Flavians gained power through Civil War. And the Severans weren't exactly the most skilled at running the state either. Lots of family trouble, Caracalla murdered his brother so he could have complete control of the empire, and there was a lot of political turmoil. So the Principate survived until the Third Century, but only just barely. I would say that Marcus Aurelius was the last truly decent emperor in the Principate.

Quoted from MisPlaced Pope:

Sertorius' example should be followed by militants and insurgents - no more blowing market places to bits.

Yeah, they should. That would make things a lot less bloody in the Middle East. But, unfortunately, that ain't gonna happen. Sad, isn't it, that nobody seems to be able to be as honorable as somebody who lived two-thousand years ago. I thought that we were supposed to learn form the past, because this guy would definitely be a great person to learn from in that respect.

[This message has been edited by Agrippa 271 (edited 10-31-2011 @ 10:18 PM).]

About rome and the republic. The republic had become ineffective. Corruption and violence around votings were one example. Senators would rather see a problem continue to exist than granting another senator the honor of solving it. Cato sometimes kept talking the whole day to prevent the senate from voting. It's hard to see how a continuation of the republic would be good for rome.

There's a common conception that the Republic was functional until Caesar came along and overthrew it - it wasn't. The entire first century BC was spent in civil war of some variety or another, and before that corruption was rampant, allowing the likes of Jugurtha to embarrass the state.

First the Social War, then Marius and Sulla, then Pompey and Sertorius followed by the Catiline Conspiracy followed by Julius Caesar and Pompey, then Octavian and Antony, then the Second Triumverate vs Cassius and Brutus, then Sextus Pompeius and finally Octavian and Antony once again. Granted, some of these were continuations of past conflicts, but the point is that there was no peace in the first century BC. This was not in any shape or form a functional government - society and Roman military superiority continued in spite of it, not because of it.

The idea that the republic wasn't functional at the time of Caesar's attack is actually a very old idea, and arguably the common perception. Gruen (late '70s) among others have suggested (convincingly, I think) that the republic wasn't necessarily predestined to fail, but rather that the civil war is what pushed it over the edge.

Syme says some similar stuff in the Roman Revolution, in which he seems to think that Antony could have kept the republic going, but Syme also had an ax to grind with Augustus, so...

Something further to consider is that the war between Caesar and Pompey and the ensuing wars that lead to Augustus are very different, and might not have been understood by the Romans to be as important (and unique) as we have later seen them.

The war between Marius and Sulla seems to have been viewed as an aberration something that only happened because of the strong, conflicting personalities of the major players, not because of deep seated problems in the republic. Presumably, the war between Caesar and Pompey was seen the same way, initially.

Our perspectives on the collapse of the republic are colored by imperial writers, especially the Augustan authors and Lucan. Suddenly, civil war has become Rome's blood curse from the very beginning (Romulus and Remus, and then Vergil even pushes it back to Aeneas by portraying the war with Turnus as a civil war) and it is a never ending cycle. Thus, Augustus is exculpated from participating in the war (it's not his fault, we've been doing this to each other for years!) and simultaneously seen as a miraculous savior, after all, he broke the curse (so portrayed in the literature).

Sallust is kind of a mid-point between "what a weird one-off occurrence civil war is" and "civil war = Rome." He conceives of cyclical civil violence, a point which is refined in the Jugurtha and fully expressed in the prologue of the Histories.

So basically, it's hard to say whether or not the republic "had" to collapse, and almost impossibly tainted by the fact that it did collapse and Augustus established a pretty stable and very long-lasting form of government in its place.

As to your point about rampant corruption allowing Jugurtha to humiliate the state, that seems to be a fabrication by Sallust in order to promote his point that virtus was rapidly collapsing. The senate of the late 2nd century BCE was not particularly corrupt, and actually seems to have dealt with the Jugurtha in an appropriate fashion at the start. He was a reputable figure (remember, he fought alongside Scipio - and Marius for that matter!), and the senate had legitimate reasons for not wanting to get involved in the dynastic disputes of a client kingdom. Of course, the war did happen, and there were significant Roman defeats, and the period did see the rise of the important players of the next generation.

Socially, the Jugurthine War was important for what happened at home (Mamilian commission, Marius' consulship, entrance of Sulla), but the war itself was pretty inconsequential.

Quoted from Vasta:

The war between Marius and Sulla seems to have been viewed as an aberration something that only happened because of the strong, conflicting personalities of the major players, not because of deep seated problems in the republic. Presumably, the war between Caesar and Pompey was seen the same way, initially.

You are right, one of the main reasons why Sulla and Marius clashed was because they hated each other, but it was the Senate, not Marius, who tried to recall Sulla, which is the reason why he marched on Rome the first time. Well no, it was actually because (I now quote directly from Julius Caesar by Philip Freeman) "...a new tribune, Sulpicius Rufus...used his bully boys in the Forum to bash heads and forced the Senate to replace Sulla with Marius."(Freeman 27). So, it wasn't entirely personal hatred of one another.

Also, Caesar did absolutely everything he could to stop a civil War, which is the last thing he wanted. It was the Senate who instigated it, and wasn't because of Pompey either, as he didn't really want a civil war. It was the Senate, and more specifically the conservative Optimates, who forced Caesar to fight the war to protect himself from his enemies, who wanted to end his career. You could say it was selfish, but he didn't start it.

The Roman Republic was completely incapable of running an empire the size of Rome, even at the relatively small size that it was in the late Republic. I could go into a vast tangent on the corruptness of the Roman government, which every major political figure after 150 b.c. must have used.

Caesar, Pompey, Crassus, Cato, even Cicero, and every other politician of the time took advantage of their power and wealth to turn the tables in their favor by lying, bribing the voters, bribing senators and tribunes (particularly the tribunes of the plebs) and dozens of other powers, skills, opportunities, to increase their own power. So, yeah, the Roman system was falling apart. I believe it was probably inevitable that it collapsed.

Sorry, if that sounded like a bit of a rant, I just would like to point out the inefficiencies of the Republic by the 1st century b.c.

[This message has been edited by Agrippa 271 (edited 11-01-2011 @ 07:42 PM).]

Well, in fact the tribune that changed the command to marius, was a polical ally of Marius. Taken into consideration Marius's fame and power, it was most likely Marius himself who commanded the tribune to pass the motion, who would in turn have Marius's support in future election, or perhaps he could go with Marius on the campaign in the east (which was to the romans the same as some kind of treasure hunt).

Caesar made use of his allies to, especially when he was in Gaul. His friends kept him protected during his campaign, but at the end of the campaign the differences between Caesar and his rivals had grown so large, that legal ways couldn't help anymore. His political allies even had to escape Rome, in fear of being murdered/arrested by the senate.

My point is, nearly all great roman leaders made use of their allies to pass some legislation issues, and those allies where willing to be used because they could climb the ladder with help of these powerful man. It might of course also be that they were really friends or supported each other because they like each other, but both always sought to gain profit from the alliance.

On the point of who was responsible for the Caesarian civil war, I agree with Adrian Goldsworthy.

He pointed out that one of the main reasons was the stubborn behavior of the hardcore enemies of Caesar, like Cato, Ahenobarbus and Bibulus.

But don't forget that Caesar, during his Consulship, formed an alliance with Pompey and Crassus, nearly bypassing the senate. And that wasn't the first time for Caesar to show a lack of respect for the traditional politics, further allietating him from people like Cato. And he had no real colleague, since he overpowered Bibulus.

And no matter what both sides did, it was Caesar that made the first move, though probably a smart move. A delay would not have brought the 2 sides together, unless Pompey would join with Caesar, but he was to proud to do so, and maybe didn't want it either. A delay would also mean more time for his enemies to fortify their position and recruit more men. Caesar had no hope of reinforcing his numbers, unless with deserters from Pompey. But still, he attacked and that makes him the agressor, how wise it may have been.

[This message has been edited by Thompsoncs (edited 11-01-2011 @ 08:15 PM).]

Quoted from Thompsoncs:

campaign in the east (which was to the romans the same as some kind of treasure hunt).

If by treasure hunt you mean armed-burglary-that-makes-you-very-very-very-very-rich-and-destroys-your-enemies-in-the-process, then yes, yes it was.

[This message has been edited by Agrippa 271 (edited 11-01-2011 @ 08:54 PM).]

Quoted from Agrippa 271:

You are right, one of the main reasons why Sulla and Marius clashed was because they hated each other, but it was the Senate, not Marius, who tried to recall Sulla, which is the reason why he marched on Rome the first time. Well no, it was actually because (I now quote directly from Julius Caesar by Philip Freeman) "...a new tribune, Sulpicius Rufus...used his bully boys in the Forum to bash heads and forced the Senate to replace Sulla with Marius."(Freeman 27). So, it wasn't entirely personal hatred of one another.

See Thompsoncs for Marius' tribune ally being responsible for Sulla's recall.

The point I was attempting to make though was not about reality, but about perception. To the next generation of Romans, when they tried to understand why the civil war between Sulla and Marius, they saw it as a personal enmity that spilled into armed conflict as opposed to something fundamentally wrong with the state. See also the death of the Gracchi. It is characterized by late republican authors as being a one-off event that resulted from the actions of the Gracchi themselves (Cicero) or a situation in which the senate went too far (Varro). Notably, it does not seem to be a situation where the Romans looked at it and said, "Well damn, this is a serious social issue that we need to solve, because allowing all wealth and political power to be controlled by the few is eventually going to bite us in the rear."

Similarly, the Marius/Sulla War was not a precursor to the Caesar/Pompey et al. wars, in which what normally would've been a political conflict escalated into violence with the rise of warlords with personal armies, but a conflict between two strong, hostile personalities.

Again, I'm focusing on perception here, not fact. Obviously, civil violence broke out for more than just people disliking one another.

Quoted from Agrippa 271:

Also, Caesar did absolutely everything he could to stop a civil War, which is the last thing he wanted. It was the Senate who instigated it, and wasn't because of Pompey either, as he didn't really want a civil war. It was the Senate, and more specifically the conservative Optimates, who forced Caesar to fight the war to protect himself from his enemies, who wanted to end his career. You could say it was selfish, but he didn't start it.

I still think the question is out on whether or not Caesar wanted a civil war. Arguably, the war could have been avoided until Curio's vote, which effectively pushed it to the point where either Caesar had to surrender and inevitably face prosecution (which he would lose) or Pompey had to lay down his legions, which were legally raised with the support of the senate (so he certainly wasn't going to do it).

Also as a point of note, the Optimates/Populares idea isn't really accurate because there certainly weren't "parties" in the way we think about them. That idea only came about in the 19th century when scholars wanted to see Whigs and Torries in ancient Rome. It just wasn't that neat, unfortunately.

Quoted from Agrippa 271:

The Roman Republic was completely incapable of running an empire the size of Rome, even at the relatively small size that it was in the late Republic. I could go into a vast tangent on the corruptness of the Roman government, which every major political figure after 150 b.c. must have used.

Caesar, Pompey, Crassus, Cato, even Cicero, and every other politician of the time took advantage of their power and wealth to turn the tables in their favor by lying, bribing the voters, bribing senators and tribunes (particularly the tribunes of the plebs) and dozens of other powers, skills, opportunities, to increase their own power. So, yeah, the Roman system was falling apart. I believe it was probably inevitable that it collapsed.

Ah, but corruption and back-door deals are the heart of Rome! This certainly wasn't only a problem of the 1st century BCE - nor was it magically solved with the slow evolution of the principate (Not to pontificate in any way, but we certainly still have our issues with it...)

The system was still working (courts were still functioning, the provinces weren't exactly in great upheaval, nor were there mass uprisings of Roman citizens), though strained. To engage in a bit of hypothetical history here, it would have required an expansion of officers with imperium as well as longer terms, so that a governor could stay in a province long enough to actually figure out what they were doing instead of showing up just in time to head back home (suitably richer).

It is extremely important to note that the only ones who talk about the system being broken are those who saw the break (Sallust) or what came afterwards (imperial authors). Of course, once Caesar did begin the civil war, it got much worse - and by the time of Octavian removing the truce between Antony and the Liberators, it was indeed over. One way or another, the republic was going to become something different.

Ok, first, I think you misunderstood a few of my points. I was just saying that the Republic in the first century b.c. was hugely corrupt. I didn't say that the Marius/Sulla conflict was a precursor to Pompey and Caesar, I just said that the Senate was what pushed Sulla to march on Rome, igniting the war. And I actually said who the tribune who recalled Sulla was.

Quoted from Vasta:

Also as a point of note, the Optimates/Populares idea isn't really accurate because there certainly weren't "parties" in the way we think about them.

True, but the Optimates were the conservative part of the Roman Senate. And you're right, the line between Popular and Optimate was often a fine one. Clodius, for instance, was a politician who was well known for being a pragmatist and taking whichever side helped to push forward his personal agenda (e.g. Revenge). However, the Optimates as a general group of conservative politicians hated Caesar. Therefore, I think it is an acceptable term to use to describe the politicians like Cato, Ahenobarbus, and Bibilus.

My main point is that the late Republican era was one of the most corrupt era's in Roman history, was incapable of holding itself together, and could even be used as a textbook example of a democratic-republic gone wrong. The reason why I feel it was so unstable was its undeniable propensity toward civil war. The Roman general became too powerful, and the generals tore the society apart.

Quoted from Agrippa 271:

Ok, first, I think you misunderstood a few of my points. I was just saying that the Republic in the first century b.c. was hugely corrupt. I didn't say that the Marius/Sulla conflict was a precursor to Pompey and Caesar, I just said that the Senate was what pushed Sulla to march on Rome, igniting the war. And I actually said who the tribune who recalled Sulla was.

I'm actually arguing that the Late Republic wasn't particularly corrupt, at least in comparison to the rest of Roman history. My basis in this lies in two things, the first being that almost all of our traditional reasoning for the excessive, spectacular corruption of the Late Republic comes from evidence that is taken from Augustan sources, who obviously had a very good reason to highlight the corruption of the Republic, because they had to justify why Augustus is special and necessary!

Sallust is the exception and Livy is borderline (having begun the first decade at least before Actium). Sallust though, has been shown to have been exceptionally a-historical (I'd start with Earl 1961 as a primer), who was trying to highlight the decline of virtus following the destruction of Carthage, which had previously united all Romans, who, as depicted in the archaeology of the Catiline, never had ever fought each other ever before - he even omits the existence of Romulus and Remus(!) (n.b., though, that he modifies this in the Histories, apparently, and establishes a cycle of peace and strife based upon metus hostilis in general). Paul 1984 also has an excellent appendix on senatorial corruption during the Jugurthine War, and Sallust's fabrication (perhaps it's better to say great exaggeration) of it.

Livy, on the other hand, shows that corruption and scandal has been going on from the very founding of the city (I've got some interesting ideas on Romulus and Remus being a later construct - but I'll save that for another time). Yes, there were great heroes, but there were also many villains in the AUC. (I won't even try to address the evidence that says Livy made most of it up).

Regarding the point about optimates, yes you are indeed correct, and using the terms optimates/populares does offer a nice shorthand for describing the Caesarian/senatorial factions. However, as in all things with Republican history, it's really complicated and about far more than just conservative/progressive.

Quoted from Agrippa 271:

My main point is that the late Republican era was one of the most corrupt era's in Roman history, was incapable of holding itself together, and could even be used as a textbook example of a democratic-republic gone wrong. The reason why I feel it was so unstable was its undeniable propensity toward civil war. The Roman general became too powerful, and the generals tore the society apart.

You're very right on one point, it can be held up to be a textbook example of a republic gone wrong - but that's because it's manufactured that way. The decadence and corruption and collapse of the Republic only seemed inevitable once it happened. We're using etiology to explain what happened - we know how it ended, therefore it must have been innate in what took place. I really don't think it was, and I think you can make an argument that the Late Republic was actually one of the "best" times in Roman culture. It's hard to believe that a generation that was innately depraved and given over to the worst kinds of decadence would have produced such things as Lucretius, or Catullus, or Cicero, even Caesar, Sallust and many more.

This was not the worst generation, to steal a phrase, because if it really was as bad as later Romans described, we never would have gotten so many amazing things from it.

As for the statement that the Romans had an undeniably propensity to civil war, I wholeheartedly disagree. I have hoped to show that this was a construction of later generations, namely Horace and Lucan, who had in fact, just given up on trying to explain how the various civil wars had happened - if it was an innate propensity, well that explains everything, and furthermore, exculpates all those who had participated.

Until the Republic actually fell, it did not have to. For more fun reading times, check out Gruen's Last Generation of the Roman Republic. It's damn long, and does have some flaws, but he makes an interesting and influential case. Essentially his thesis, which I'm following here, is that collapse of the Republic happened because of the Caesarian/Octavian civil wars, the civil wars did not happen because the Republic was already collapsing.

You are most correct though, in saying that the growing power of individual generals did their fair share in nailing the Republic's coffin shut. With the failure of the ruling oligarchy to adequately fund and provide for the now massive standing armies, and leaving it to the generals, they ensured that those standing armies would be personally loyal to their general. It is worth considering that if Caesar was just an officer of the state, with his legions paid for by a government stipend, it is far less likely that they would have been so eager to join him. Augustus correctly realized this, and by making himself summus imperator, so to speak, he ensured that the troops would be more loyal to him than to their individual commanders.

[This message has been edited by Vasta (edited 11-01-2011 @ 11:58 PM).]

Ok, first, I think you misunderstood a few of my points. I was just saying that the Republic in the first century b.c. was hugely corrupt. I didn't say that the Marius/Sulla conflict was a precursor to Pompey and Caesar, I just said that the Senate was what pushed Sulla to march on Rome, igniting the war. And I actually said who the tribune who recalled Sulla was.

I'd say the marius/sulla conflict was actually a precursor to the Caesar/Pompey war. I don't say that it started the caesarian war directly, but Caesar was related to Marius, married with the daughter of Cinna and the story goes that the young Caesar defied Sulla, but was allowed to live. Caesar grew up in a period in which the republic was no longer sacred and peaceful. Political conflicts were more and more solved with agression and murder (grachii, Marius vs sulla twice, and if I recall correctly in Marius's time there were also some arrested aristocrats, who were murdered. Then there's also the sertorian war in Iberia, and a revolt of Lepidus, which failed.

Caesar grew up with a less ideal image of the Republic and knew that powerful men could stand up to the senate.

I'd say the marius/sulla conflict was actually a precursor to the Caesar/Pompey war.

Insomuch as a march on Rome becoming normalised and acceptable by the times of Caesar, I'd definitely agree here.

Quoted from Vasta:

...the Late Republic wasn't particularly corrupt, at least in comparison to the rest of Roman history. My basis in this lies in two things, the first being that almost all of our traditional reasoning for the excessive, spectacular corruption of the Late Republic comes from evidence that is taken from Augustan sources, who obviously had a very good reason to highlight the corruption of the Republic, because they had to justify why Augustus is special and necessary!

I disagree. Not with what you think about the Augustan sources, but about the comparison to the rest of Roman history. In the late Republic, it is not just the appointed officials who were corrupt, as would have been inevitable before and after, but the senators and ruling families of patricians themselves. Later in Roman history they had much almost no power politically, and wouldn't have had an the run of the government, greatly limiting what these guys could do, making the temptation less, and meaning that they weren't as corrupt. But in the Republic, these were the men running the state.

Caesar's campaign to get the office of Pontifex Maximus is a great example of how the senators bribed voters to get offices. He basically bribed his way into the office of Pontifex Maximus. And they didn't just bribe voters. Both Clodius and Curio were Caesar's lackeys in the Senate while he was in Gaul. As for the courts, well, one of Sulla's reforms was to have the senators be judges. Caesar was a prosecutor on two cases of corruption charges brought against governors by the people of the provinces they formerly presided over (and bled dry of every coin they could find). Although Caesar presented the evidence well, it probably isn't even necessary to tell you how both governors (who just so happened to be senators) where both got off on all charges. And it is probable that this would not have been the result today.

As for whether not the republic's collapse was unavoidable, four civil wars in less than a hundred years wasn't exactly a great sign of the Republic's stability. And just because it wouldn't have appeared to be on the verge of collapse then doesn't mean it wasn't. And although, as you say, just because something happened, doesn't mean it was inevitable, it also doesn't mean that it wasn't inevitable. If Caesar had been defeated, and Octavian never came to power, then someone else would have stepped in.

Even if the Senate reformed the way they payed the troops, there were still rebellions by generals in the Principate after Augustus fixed the pay problem; we can therefore safely say that the rebellions would have continued during the Republic, too, especially with the amount of success that generals had had in the past. Civil wars tore down the empire in the third and fourth chenturies a.d.; the same thing would have happened to the Republic. As we know, Octavian became Augustus, and the Republic became an empire.

Quoted from Vasta:

...you can make an argument that the Late Republic was actually one of the "best" times in Roman culture. It's hard to believe that a generation that was innately depraved and given over to the worst kinds of decadence would have produced such things as Lucretius, or Catullus, or Cicero, even Caesar, Sallust and many more.

There is nothing to really distinguish the 1st century b.c. from any other part of Roman history when it comes to culture. As for Caesar, Cicero, Lucretius, and the rest of the men you listed, Caesar was extraordinarily extravagant character. He built a beautiful villa on the Lake Nemi in the Italian countryside, then tore it down when he decided that it wasn't up to the standards he set. And Sallust committed a great amount of oppression and extortion when he was governor of Africa Nova, escaping from condemnation only due to the influence of Caesar.

Although many great poets are from this time frame, it was not in any way the pinnacle of Roman culture; nor was it even close. Rome lasted for another 300 years or so, right? Generally, one would think that when Roman power was greatest, in the 2nd century a.d., its culture would have begun to reach its climax. Several religions, and a vast number of grand buildings where yet to be seen in Rome during the late Republic. These were all important parts of Roman culture. Although certainly, there was a strong culture present, it was definitely not the even one of the "best" times culturally.

Quoted from Vasta:

As for the statement that the Romans had an undeniably propensity to civil war, I wholeheartedly disagree. I have hoped to show that this was a construction of later generations, namely Horace and Lucan, who had in fact, just given up on trying to explain how the various civil wars had happened - if it was an innate propensity, well that explains everything, and furthermore, exculpates all those who had participated.

Until the Republic actually fell, it did not have to. For more fun reading times, check out Gruen's Last Generation of the Roman Republic. It's damn long, and does have some flaws, but he makes an interesting and influential case. Essentially his thesis, which I'm following here, is that collapse of the Republic happened because of the Caesarian/Octavian civil wars, the civil wars did not happen because the Republic was already collapsing.

Over the course of their history, the Romans fought twenty-one major civil wars. Twenty-one. If that doesn't show a propensity toward civil war, I don't know what does. And 12 of these wars were fought during the late Republic. Civil War was the chief cause of the collapse of the Republic. It's failure to limit the power of the generals meant that for a hundred years, Roman soldiers spent much of their time fighting one another, not the external enemies that plagued the Republic.

Although the corruption that characterized the late Republic didn't really bring it down, the civil wars did. Indeed, one could say that over-powerful generals and civil war were the disease, and that civil war was also the symptom. For did Sulla's march on Rome not help inspire Caesar? And did Caesar not inspire Octavian and Antony? How could the Republic have survived once this point was reached?